This paper presents a hydrodynamical view of the Aharonov–Bohm effect, using Nelson’s formulation of quantum mechanics. Our aim is to gain a better understanding of the mysteries behind this effect, such as why in the prototype Aharonov–Bohm system with a cylinder the motion of a particle is affected in a region where there is no magnetic field. Our main purpose is to use Nelson’s formulation to describe the effect and demonstrate that it can be explained by the direct action of (...) the current surrounding the magnetic field region. Although conventional theories try to present vector potentials as more physically significant than magnetic fields, our purpose is to demonstrate that such debate regarding the comparison between vector potentials and magnetic fields should not exist at all; within our context, magnetic fields and vector potentials serve as tools for finding other fundamental hydrodynamical quantities that arise from the interaction between the quantum background fields described by Nelson’s quantum theory, and thus, play a secondary role at the explanation of this phenomenon. So, in this paper, we do not intend to participate in a debate regarding whether we should give a local (based on e/m forces and e/m fields) or non-local (based on vector potentials) description of the phenomenon. Finally, we investigate the relationship between hidden variables and quantum fluctuations, their role in this phenomenon and their connection with the gauge transformation of the vector potential, that plays a leading role in quantum AB systems. (shrink)

Материалы сборника предназначены для специалистов.

Dialektika mifa -- Raboty 1916-1988 godov -- Istorii︠a︡ filosofii kak shkola mysli.

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii: December 23, 1972, marked the seventieth birthday of A. F. Shishkin, leading Soviet philosopher, major specialist in the field of ethics, one of the oldest and at the same time most active members of the editorial board of our journal. The editors sincerely congratulate Aleksandr Fedorovich on this anniversary and wish him further successes in his work, firm health, and long years of life.

The purpose of this book is to examine and explicate a definition given in Philosophical Investigations. The definition of the meaning of a word is that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Hallett understands this as a definition in the strict sense of the word. In Chapter I, the author looks to the Tractatus for its treatment of the picture theory of meaning and the Bedeutung/sinn distinction. The conclusion which he pulls from the early work (...) is that, for Wittgenstein, meaning was already in a proposition by way of the meaning of names. Yet, only in the use or application, i.e., in a proposition with sense is meaning revealed. Although the Tractatus is far from saying that meaning is use, certain guiding themes are elaborated and carried into later works; namely, the search for meaning, the impossibility of meaning outside use, and meaning as revealed by use. Chapter II, III, and especially IV bear the brunt of establishing Hallett’s thesis that Wittgenstein presented a significant and sound definition. He begins by showing what Wittgenstein proved meaning not to be: meaning is not images, objects, mental referents, nor feelings. All of these theories have convincing confirmation in certain respects, yet analysis, i.e., observation of the actual working of language, shows each to be too narrow. In making his transition to the true definition, the author shows Wittgenstein elaborating the theses that meaning is to be found in the system or context of language. These are elaborated only to be cast aside as were the previous suggestions. The pattern elicited from these examinations is that meaning is use and, hence, defined as such. To explicate the definition, Hallett presents and examines seven characteristics of use: complexity, regularity and utility, abstraction, openness, vagueness, variety, and family resemblances. The book concludes with a consideration of the major objections to Wittgenstein’s definition. There are too many objections presented to be handled justly. For the most part, the argument is superficial, usually presuming a familiarity with the issue, and with but an indication of how the objection could be handled. The strength of the book is that it gives an organization to Wittgenstein’s later thinking, especially by way of the above-mentioned seven characteristics. In identifying and elucidating them, Hallett does Wittgenstein students a great service. Its chief weakness, although pale in regard to the overall worth, is that the main thesis is not firmly established. To say that a precise and complete definition is given is contrary to what is maintained throughout the Investigations, and perhaps a serious misreading of the German word, erklaren, as the precise English phrase, "to define." There are extensive notes and an adequate index.—W. A. F. (shrink)

In order to cure the social sciences of many of their inveterate diseases, it seems to me extremely important and useful to support and develop in some measure A.S. Tsipko's ideas on the doctrinal preconditions of our difficulties and failures in the building of socialism, ideas that have provoked such wide-ranging responses.

This passage was attributed to Menander Protector by Bernhardy, who, influenced apparently by Men. Prot. fr. 43 , suggested that here the name disguised the of Menander. This explanation, besides interfering with the text without due cause, ignores altogether the name . In fact, the incident occurs a century earlier, in the period A.D. 467–70. Anagastes is then found in Roman service in Thrace during the reign of Leo . Moreover, the name of Anagastes is linked with an easily recognized (...) variant of in Jo. Ant., fr. 205. (shrink)

An investigation into the prosopography of Libanius shows a confusion of identity in the following cases. The textual references are to Foerster's Teubner edition, of which the index compiled by Richtsteig is to be handled with caution.

This problem was not the subject of any single book or article of Lenin's. However, in his writings , Lenin often had to deal with this problem and to elucidate significant aspects of it. We believe it necessary, to the degree that is possible within the confines of an article, to examine Lenin's major postulates with respect to this problem, bearing in mind not only the constant need to study this great heritage but also the fact that Lenin's postulates on (...) cognition and evaluation are of current importance in connection with present discussions on questions closely related to this. (shrink)

The discussion begins with a familiar and defensible characterization of the eureka moment, according to which it is the unexpected product of separate and often seemingly incompatible perspectives. The principal aim of the discussion is to explain how, so characterized, vision-related eureka moments can occur. To fulfill this aim, the discussion employs a notion of crosstalk, in which cognitive interference slightly increases as a result of the creative thinker's considerable, albeit only partly successful, pre-eureka cognitive effort. Such crosstalk, it is (...) suggested, is likely to occur when top-down visual imaging repeatedly stimulates pyramidal cells closely apposed to others that, although simultaneously active, are part of bottom-up visual perception that is initially cognitively unrelated to such imaging. It is further suggested that local circuitry, in the form of inhibitory interneurons, can synchronize cells associated with these initially separate processes, thus causing subsequent perceptual patterns to be subtly modified by pre-eureka problem-solving imagery. This modification, it is claimed, may help explain the unexpected shift in visual perception that accompanies the creative thinker's eureka moment, a shift that can improve the thinker's subsequent understanding of the relevance of information to a problem's solution. (shrink)

By focussing on the intentional character of observation in science, we argue that Constructive Empiricism—B.C. van Fraassen’s much debated and explored view of science—is inconsistent. We then argue there are at least two ways out of our Inconsistency Argument, one of which is more easily to square with Constructive Empiricism than the other.